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What is Philosophy?
Iris Murdoch once remarked that, ‘to do philosophy is to explore one’s own 
temperament, and yet at the same time to attempt to discover the truth’.1 Elsewhere, 
Murdoch talks about a necessary tension within the discipline:
It is sometimes said, either irritably or with a certain satisfaction, that 
philosophy makes no progress. It is certainly true, and I think this is an abiding 
and not a regrettable characteristic of the discipline, that philosophy has in a 
sense to keep trying to return to the beginning: a thing which it is not at all 
easy to do. There is a two-way movement in philosophy, a movement towards 
the building of elaborate theories, and a move back again towards the 
consideration of simple and obvious facts. McTaggart says that time is unreal, 
Moore replies that he has just had his breakfast. Both these aspects of 
philosophy are necessary to it.2
To explore one’s own temperament and to try to discover the truth; to keep in mind 
the simple and the obvious and to construct necessarily ever more elaborate 
explanations: there is a rhythm of expansion and return which is vital to philosophy, a 
kind o f respiration which must endure, despite philosophy’s many transformations 
during its long career. Murdoch presents a partial view of that respiration of 
philosophy, a return by philosophy to basics even as it stretches out towards a 
complete, articulate understanding, insofar as this is possible.
Philosophy must keep both of these impulses together as one repeated rhythmic 
figure. There is a certain sense in which what philosophy studies is not in the least 
esoteric or recondite: it raises systematically questions and issues which arise 
spontaneously for the limited, vulnerable, that is, incarnate, consciousness which I am 
and we are, and for which my own existence is opaque. Indeed, philosophy may be 
seen as the necessary outgrowth of that incarnation and opacity. The opacity calls for 
light: ‘know thyself was the watchword philosophy inherited from the Delphic 
Oracle via Socrates, and to know oneself, in particular individuality as well as in 
terms of one’s place in real and conceptual contexts, is still the philosophical 
vocation. Let us look more closely at this theme.
Philosophy is impossible for animals, which are prelinguistic in that they cannot ask 
‘why?’ or ‘whither?’, and for Divinity, which can only be self-transparently as its own 
why. Philosophy is the necessary outgrowth of the human’s neither being divine nor 
merely animal, but being a kind of existence between these two estates.3
Heidegger called this ‘between’ Dasein, existence, engaged reality, and he noted that 
its fundamental nature was to be a kind of being for which its own being is an issue.4 
To be human is not to be a fixed and self-enclosed ‘thing’—indeed there is nothing 
which is that, even though that mistaken picture has an allure—it is to be a process of 
a certain kind, namely a self-directive, freely self-realising, process. Self-directive, yet 
not completely; free, yet not absolutely; self-realising, but always carrying within it 
the surd of the given.
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This is the earth from which all philosophy grows, and its object is this unending 
questionability of our existence, its why and its whither. Far from being a 
disembodied Cartesian observer, Dasein is a being essentially incarnate in the world, 
one which can realise itself only in and through its necessary relations to the people 
and things with which it is confronted in the world.
Philosophy is therefore concerned with my decisions and their basis, my place within 
the human as well as the natural world. I decide how to be, 1 decide what I am to be. I 
decide how I shall spend the essentially limited capital which is my time, my duration 
of existence. 1 am circumscribed by death, the possibility which cancels all my other 
possibilities, and am constrained also by the—social, cultural, somatic, physical in the 
broadest sense—geography which I cannot choose but in which I already find myself.
Yet within this limited space I can make something of myself, and this expression has 
more literal weight than we might at first suspect. The situation, the geography in 
which I find myself demands that I choose. To choose is inseparable from making real 
one of the potentialities, mine and of my world, which belong to me as the entity I am, 
at this precise moment and place in the process which is my existence: I am in and of 
the world and what I do affects it. The future exists in the present as a set of rays of 
diverse potentiality, each ray a possible world, originating at the present moment. 
Choice helps to make actual one o f those possibilities, though it is not the only 
actualising factor.
To make real one potential is to reject others which are incompatible with it, and 
which will therefore never be realised. All such choice is a choice of self—what shall 
I be?—but a self which is essentially related and relational, never other than in a 
world with other selves and things. So, the question as to which is the more 
worthwhile possibility o f being is an inescapable one. That it is possible to spend my 
limited possibilities wastefully—a literal waste of self, for myself and for others who 
are involved with me—and that I could have done other than I did, that I am therefore 
free, are the issues which give choice its drama, its sharpness.
One of the finest presentations o f the drama o f choice is to be found in the 
Confessions of Augustine. The story really concerns the identity of Augustine, who 
Augustine is, who Augustine is to be, and this identity is not a simple or univocal 
relation of sameness between states: identity embraces quite radical change. The 
narrative tells of the rejection by Augustine of a false self or selves in favour of what 
he finds to be his best possibility of being, which he embraces as his true self. All 
other selves were false precisely as embodying less of the good than that embodied by 
the chosen self. We can imagine an Augustine who never converted, his great 
intellectual and emotional powers as he grew older poisoning him and those with 
whom he was intimate, his natural tendencies towards rage, vanity and manipulation 
coming to the fore. Or we can imagine an Augustine who converted later or earlier 
than did the actual Augustine. But these counterfactual Augustines are counterfactual 
due to the choices actually made by Augustine, within the constraints o f his existential 
geography. He chose to be, he chose a potentiality of his identity for the greatest 
good, and became the Augustine we now know, and to know whom was a benefit to 
those others who were his friends, making actual a world in which he became the 
teacher-ffiend par excellence to many, aiding them in their own quest for the 
realisation of themselves in the good.5
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To choose is to choose under the behest of the good, for the sake of the good, in virtue 
of the attraction of the good. Otherwise, there is no real choice but caprice or sheer 
randomness. To be free is to be able to choose for the sake of the good. In this way, 
‘goodness’, ‘choice’, ‘freedom’ ‘constraint’, ‘se lf and ‘other’ are rubrics for the 
issues which arise necessarily and spontaneously for each and every human being, 
and they form the necessary content of any discourse which can yield understanding 
of this human predicament. I underline that without the possibility of such discourse, 
the specifically human would disappear into animality—whose being ‘dumb’ consists 
precisely in this absence—and the exercise of what freedom humans have, and to 
which this discourse is necessary, would become impossible.
Such issues emerge in the life of every individual and are handled by him or her, each 
in his or her own way, precisely because human beings are irreducibly individual. 
Although it might be said that we are all identical in one way or another, since the 
predicate ‘x is human’ means the same thing every time it is correctly applied, the 
tissue of the predicate is open, so that it is quasi-analogical, and not strictly univocal. 
We ought, perhaps, to think of the predicate as being like a complex formula with 
very many variables; abstract in relation to the dense particularity of the real which it 
tries—and fails—definitively to express, but able in its systematic unclarity, its 
fuzziness, to embrace such diverse interpretations of what it is to be human as those 
supplied by, say, Stalin or Saint Therese o f Lisieux. To inhabit the world, to live, is to 
be obliged to choose, and therefore to be obliged to search for the enlightenment 
which enables choice. This is what it is to ‘explore one’s own temperament’, or, to 
attempt to follow the Socratic dictum: ‘know thyself.
But as soon as we begin to raise such questions, the impulse exists to understand as 
deeply as possible, to question systematically, to compare our experiences with those 
of others, to shine a light though ignorance and forgetfulness, to make explicit what is 
implicit, to construct a theory, or simply, to talk. Construct a theory? The notion of 
theory tends to have a bad reputation today, tending to suggest a kind of escapism, 
although the movement to theory and the notion of theory itself need only be 
construed as the impulse towards the richest, most adequate and comprehensive and 
nuanced understanding possible, which is more like the connotation of the Greek 
theoria, which is at bottom a seeing, a view of things as they really are. An eminently 
clear, and indeed, a noble example of this drive, is, I think, the following:
Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, 
necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our 
experience can be interpreted. By this notion of ‘interpretation’ I mean that 
everything of which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or 
thought, shall have the character of a particular instance of the general scheme. 
Thus the philosophical scheme should be coherent, logical and, in respect to 
its interpretation, applicable and adequate. Here ‘applicable’ means that some 
items of experience are thus interpretable, and ‘adequate’ means that there are 
no items incapable of such interpretation.6
To engage in this kind of project is inevitably to move away from the immediately 
concrete, which for some philosophers is already a fault. Other philosophers, nurtured 
on the contemporary French distrust of grands ricits, might see in it a kind of tyranny 
or violence, the kind associated with the project of Hegel, which seems to many to
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involve the maiming of reality—usually vulnerable human reality7—on the 
Procrustean bed of absolute knowledge. Such charges cannot be levelled against the 
philosopher whom I have just quoted, A. N. Whitehead, whose overtly ‘speculative’ 
philosophy inspires thinkers whose thought is— as was Whitehead’s—concerned with 
the preservation o f the environment and with sustainable living, with human rights 
and dignity, and with the common good, and who, like Whitehead himself, not only 
reject all violence, tyranny and injustice, but actively struggle against these evils.8
But if the history of philosophy, the history that is, of such ‘speculative’ attempts, 
teaches us anything, it is that an ‘absolute’ philosophy, an unsurpassable theory which 
is finally comprehensive, is impossible. As Goedel pointed out in another context, 
there can be no complete and coherent system, which embraces all truth. A Hegel will 
inevitably be followed by a Kierkegaard, the reaching out to heaven by a return to the 
earth. A genuine philosophy such as that of Whitehead, as opposed to an ideology or 
systematic distortion of reality, therefore must embody both; philosophy must breathe. 
Recall Murdoch: ‘it is sometimes said, either irritably or with a certain satisfaction, 
that philosophy makes no progress. It is certainly true, and ... this is an abiding and 
not a regrettable characteristic of the discipline’; philosophy must try to be, and will 
inevitably fail to be, comprehensive and complete,
But how are we to conceive philosophy, if not as a breaker’s yard of wrecked 
systems, outmoded even as they were built? How do we avoid falling into a 
deadening—and logically untenable9—relativism, which tells us that what’s true for 
you is true for you and what’s true for me is true for me, and thus acts as the reductio 
ad absurdum of all our efforts?
The answer lies in the fact that philosophy happens as conversation. Schools and 
theories are not churches, and do not, and cannot, demand exclusive allegiance. Truth 
is revealed as ruling value precisely as that which alone is worthy of our allegiance, 
and which stands not as already attained, but as to be attained, as the goal and 
meaning of our intellectual striving. But to say that is to say (if we say truly) that we 
are already in partial possession of it, for we can even now utter true sentences—if we 
could not, truth would be shut off from us. Moreover, the fact of having access to true 
propositions here and now, though this truth is de facto  limited by ignorance and 
falsity, demands the overstepping of those barriers, towards ever greater truth, which 
is asymptotically approached. At no point can we hope for the absolute annulation of 
ignorance and falsity, a state which is forever beyond the human situation, which is 
inconceivable without these limits. Even the most adequate possible account of, say, 
an historical period, or the course o f evolution in a given geological epoch, must 
remain in ignorance of a vast amount of data which are irretrievably lost, must miss 
the particularity, the full and unique history of the inhabitants of such epochs, whether 
animal or human. Even in something as small-scale as a family history, much that was 
once known is lost at the death of an elderly relative, certainly their first-person 
perspective on events. In this, philosophy is no different from any other discipline: at 
no point can we imagine the last scientist or historian laying down the pen and saying 
that their discipline is now complete—after a Newton there is also an Einstein.
Truth is a value and an only asymptotically attainable goal; it is a nice reflection that, 
just as the asymptote cuts the line at infinity though it draws ever closer to it, 
knowledge and reality are only realised coterminously, if they ever are, in the Divine.
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Without the presupposition of truth, however asymptotically we must approach it, 
there is mere difference o f viewpoints, but no possibility of improvement, and we are 
back in the frictionless nullity of relativism.10 We move along the curve towards that 
infinitely distant identity by dialogue, by the confrontation of perspectivally divergent 
view-points. Murdoch perceptively describes Hegel, who is often cast in the role of 
absolutising villain, as the ‘philosopher who, while not being the greatest, contains 
possibly more truth than any other'. More truth, but not the absolute and final word. 
This makes of Hegel a worthwhile dialogue partner who has much to teach us. Our 
appropriation of his thought must necessarily involve a process of mutual correction, 
and this is the reality o f dialogue, in which alone we can hope, insofar as this is 
possible, to participate in truth, to have our ignorance overcome and our 
misconceptions revealed for what they are.
This is recognised by Plato who almost always casts philosophy explicitly as 
dialogue, and as an exploration o f the possibilities given in dialogue. Insofar as we are 
alone, our ignorance and delusion are left unchallenged; in dialogue we participate in 
truth, and can have access to an ever-less-distorted view of the world and of our place 
in it, a view necessary to our decision-making. The Cartesian-style thinker, who 
believes it possible to attain truth se solum alloquendo consigns himself to the 
permanence of unhealed distortion and ignorance in his thought, a state from which 
the instinct for truth of the historical Descartes—as opposed to his conceptual persona 
in the Meditations—rescued him.12 Truth can only ever be ours and never mine; a 
‘truth’ which is in principle mine and not yours, is delusion.13
This makes philosophy the democratic ‘public space’ par excellence, for the search 
for truth consists in the conscientious contributions of all the partners over time. John 
Henry Newman gives a masterly delineation the kind of epistemic virtues which are 
necessary to the discovery of truth when he writes in the Grammar o f  Assent:
We have arrived at these conclusions—not ex opere operato, by a scientific 
necessity independent of ourselves—but by the action of our own minds, by 
our own individual perception of the truth in question, under a sense of duty to 
those conclusions and with an intellectual conscientiousness.14
All inquiry, as Newman well understood, is co-constituted by ethical and logical 
principles. He well understood also the life and historical evolution of understanding, 
which we have been discussing. Here is his brilliant and suggestive sketch o f the same 
theme, from his work the Essay on Development—and from the idea’s point of view!
being the germination, growth, and perfection of some living...truth, in the 
minds o f men during a sufficient period...Its development then is not like a 
mathematical theorem worked out on paper, in which each successive advance 
is a pure evolution from a foregoing, but it is carried on through individuals 
and bodies of men; it employs their minds as instruments, and depends upon 
them while it uses them. ...It grows when it incorporates; and its purity 
consists not in isolation, but in its continuity and sovereignty.15
Newman is above all a philosopher of the organic and concrete; in the above passage 
he shows his grasp of the contingent steps in the evolution of an idea, of some 
moment of understanding. It evolves not predictably like a theorem, but by combining
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the diverse and contingent contributions of ‘individuals and bodies of men’, 
conscientious individual participants each with his or her own unique perception of 
the truth in question; its identity consists not in ‘isolation’, in failing to incorporate, to 
‘prehend’, to use Whitehead’s pregnant expression, within it the reality of other ideas, 
but in ‘continuity and sovereignty’.
If then, truth can only be participated in through dialogue, it becomes the task of the 
philosopher to understand this dialogue, to make the ethico-logical principles which 
constitute it, and their work within it, visible. Some philosophers have in recent years 
taken on this task. A seminal contribution in this regard is Karl-Otto ApePs essay, 
‘The a priori o f the Communication Community and the Foundations of Ethics: the 
Problem of a Rational Foundation of Ethics in the Scientific Age’, in which Apel ably 
demonstrates the interwovenness of ethics and logic in all rational life. In response to 
the Kantian question of whether the Devil can be a logician—that is, the question of 
whether or not an evil will can make use of logic as a value-neutral tool in the pursuit 
of its evil ends—he writes as follows:
Pierce pointed out that truth, in the sense of the consensus postulate of the 
logic of science, cannot be attained by finite individuals and that, for this 
reason, membership o f the argumentative community of scholars incorporates 
a basic transcendence of the egoism of finite beings—a kind of self-surrender 
in terms of ‘logical socialism’. This means that the Devil, inasmuch as he 
desired to be a member of the community of argumentation would for ever 
more have to behave towards its members [so as to derive benefit from their 
undistorted contributions],..as if he had overcome egoism...This appears to 
indicate that the moral norm which is presupposed by the will to truth, and, 
therefore, by membership of the unlimited community of argumentation 
cannot be a ‘hypothetical imperative’...The fact that the search for truth must 
also anticipate the morality of an ideal communication community when it 
presupposes intersubjective consensus will most probably reveal a modem 
analogue to the classical doctrine of the ‘transcendentals’...The identity of 
unum, bonum and verum— must still be posited by the modem philosophy o f a 
historically precarious mediation between theory and practice as a necessary 
postulate in terms o f a critique o f  meaning and, with regard to its realization, 
as the ‘principle of hope’.16
It is a notable lack in modem, and some contemporary, philosophy that there is little 
consideration o f the degrees o f intimacy an individual enjoys with others, a topic 
which was taken to be of the utmost importance in ancient and medieval thought, 
treated there under the heading o f friendship. In Kant, despite the ‘kingdom of ends’ 
formulation of the Categorical Imperative, die moral agent tends to remain aloof and 
lonely, however rational the sovereign self may be. In Heidegger too, there is no real 
other. Perhaps it is in Ldvinas’s conception of the face of the other that we come 
closest in the contemporary period to the real presence of the other, as one who is a 
freedom beyond the closed circle of my intentions and enjoyments, and who as 
vulnerable, as suffering, relativises them. The rich man o f the parable is not 
condemned because he goes out of his way to torture Lazarus, but because he simply 
steps over him, ignoring his suffering. The other is one who makes my ethical space 
our space, makes a we of an I, such that my good is not and cannot be disjoined from 
that o f the other. My good must always in some measure be our good, and the good,
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which in ancient and medieval thought is called happiness, is the one in which all 
these goods are harmonised.
Thus, an understanding of the way in which our coming together in a just community 
can be achieved is an issue for philosophy, as well as the nature of that justice itself. 
Ethics segues into politics, the philosophical investigation of the nature of justice. 
Further themes which are disclosed as essential to this essentially shared medium of 
dialogue are: the nature of argument, how we validly draw conclusions, how we 
interpret, what it is to know; and each of these forms a relatively independent 
investigation within the complex discipline of philosophy, namely logic, hermeneutics 
and epistemology.
But this is not all. The note of freedom in our account so far, as well as the nature of 
the self, as subject or as inter-subject, are inescapable issues for philosophy. The 
freedom of the self is presupposed by all discourse, and any denial of it is 
inconsistent, at least as a performative contradiction, for the belief that our freedom is 
illusory is equivalent to the claim that I must hold the belief whether it is true or not. 
The ineliminable intersubjectivity of the self is likewise a presupposition of all 
discourse, such that subjectivity is only possible as intersubjectivity. Yet, these issues 
are not self-evident, though they may be made transparent by analysis. This task, 
which takes us into the presuppositions of ethics and of the other investigations we 
have mentioned, shapes the discipline which is variously called philosophical 
psychology or philosophical anthropology, and consists in the delineation of the 
structures necessary to the free, ineluctably ethical intersubjectivity which we are, 
which Dasein consists in.
Moreover, if  discourse and truth are to be themes for philosophical investigation, then 
the nature of language’s relation to reality, language as mediating truth, must also be 
systematically investigated. If a realistic account of truth is one which commends 
itself as the most adequate account of the nature o f truth, then it becomes evident that 
this is possible only if  the categorial framework of language is identical to the 
architecture of reality. Logic can and must be used in the disengagement and 
disclosure o f this categorial framework, which can be shown to consist in three items, 
namely, entity, property and relation.17 These lead on to further topics such as 
process—since ‘entity’ is equivalent, not just to ‘thing’, but to ‘event’—and thereby 
the question o f the nature of time, and that of causality, from which the nature of time 
is inseparable. To perform this investigation into ‘what there is’ is to engage in that 
branch o f philosophy called ‘ontology’. And it is here perhaps that we come closest to 
the kind of philosophy called ‘speculative’ by Whitehead,
And above these questions, and prompted by them, philosophy asks the one which 
was probably best formulated by Kant as: what may I hope? This, despite superficial 
appearances, seems to be identical to the Leibnizian question: why is there something 
rather than nothing? These, or if they are ultimately equivalent, this, is a 
‘transcendental’ question in that it brings us up against the limits of human being, for 
this question englobes the whole of existence in its horizon, and asks for a why for 
everything, asks for a reason for a hope beyond hope, for an enlightenment essentially 
located beyond the human horizon. The history of philosophy shows very diverse 
mappings of the geography which supports this question. Modem approaches tend to 
deconstruct the question as question, placing the ‘beyond the middle’ which it intends
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in the realm of faith, or to seek a hope or a reason immanent in the geography, as 
subject to interruption and vulnerability as every other object in that landscape. The 
classical approaches, which are still discussed as viable options, find a vector of 
transcendence within rationality itself (Anselm), a vector which leads beyond the 
realm o f limited perfection to ‘that than which no greater can be thought’, or to the 
unsayable, or find the insufficiency of the world for its own existence to be the 
occasion for the appearance of the term ‘God’ (Aquinas) as that without which there 
would be nothing. This concern for ultimate human fate is what is called 
‘metaphysics’, and as such betokens a going beyond the realm of the temporal, the 
condition o f all possible experience, to the unsayable, to self-existent existence itself. 
Immanentist philosophy denies the possibility of metaphysics, but the decision made 
in that regard conditions all philosophical questioning—for the purview of 
metaphysics takes in all ‘lower’ questions—and modifies how we view all the topics 
investigated by philosophy.
In this way, even at its most seemingly abstract, philosophy returns to its beginning, 
to the soil from which it grows, but not as mere repetition; rather as envisaging that 
beginning anew, through the experience gained over the journey which I have 
attempted to describe. Such is the rhythm necessary to philosophy: philosophy is not 
linear, but circular.
The Place of Philosophy in the University
If the image of philosophy which I have been trying to explicate is accurate, then it 
has already become clear that philosophy is always and already a conversation partner 
of all other disciplines, in the sense of a mutually corrective encounter which leads in 
the direction of truth, securing the partners’ conscientious contributions by coevally 
logical and ethical means. It will immediately be objected that philosophy has nothing 
to offer to quantum physics, say, which is a value-free empirical and theoretical 
inquiry into the nature o f physical reality. This, however, is an inadequate response.
Admittedly, philosophy does not produce quantum-physical results, but it is erroneous 
to think that such a discipline exists outside the territory inhabited by philosophy. 
Every discipline, as rational enterprise, instantiates the logico-ethical, the dialogical, 
structure which we have attempted to sketch above. This is not just to say that logic 
provides the canon for valid argumentation. As ethico-logical enterprise, science 
requires the elucidation of those ethical principles which form and govern it and 
which assign it a place within the totality of human good. The necessity for this kind 
of investigation is witnessed more clearly in those branches of science which touch 
more obviously on human wellbeing, and are required to have overt canons of ethical 
procedure, but no branch of science, no branch of the acquisition of knowledge, can 
do without such investigation, otherwise, such an investigation would be, per 
impossibile, of neutral worth, with no place in the totality of good.
A scientist may ask such questions, systematically investigate them, and as such 
ceases for the moment to be a pure scientist, and becomes a philosopher—and 
experience reveals that this examination is best accomplished in an interdisciplinary 
manner. The same is clear with regard to the professions whose practice is inculcated 
in the university: their aims, and goals relative to overall human wellbeing are to be 
questioned systematically, and for this to be done adequately, it must be done in an 
interdisciplinary manner. I do not intend here to prescribe the manner and detail of the
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interaction between philosophy and a given discipline, or to examine a range of such 
disciplines to map where philosophical discourse is mandatory: the practice of these 
disciplines raises ethical questions with regard to their purpose, the kind of benefit 
which they confer, and ‘best ethical practice’ in their way of conducting themselves. 
Very often ethical questions bear on who loses and who wins, and what the nature of 
the loss is, and whether the win justifies it. A more radical way of putting it would be: 
who is to be hurt? A fruitful interdisciplinary collaboration is one in which such 
questions are allowed to appear in all their complexity, in the fullness of their content 
and scope; the kinds of responses to be given them decided a priori by neither side. In 
and through this collaboration, the particular principles which govern this particular 
area are gradually elucidated, and how those principles instantiate ineluctables such as 
‘do no harm’, ‘cause no innocent suffering’, ‘respect the dignity o f persons’, is 
revealed, thereby defining in greater clarity the meaning o f the ineluctables. It could 
be said that all human life is an exploration of what the word ‘good’ (or ‘true’, and so 
on) means, and that history constitutes a maieutic, cultivating the good and true, and 
eliminating the bogus. Moral progress depends on this growth and on this elimination, 
for this process enables the gradual realisation of the good.
In all such dialogue, the stakeholders are not merely the practitioners of philosophy 
and its dialogue partner, but the whole of society whose good is being envisaged. And 
although, as we saw, such debate democratically mobilises all conscientious 
contributions and includes them in its evolution, there is a more profound principle of 
inclusion at work, such that the partners must explicitly represent the interests of all 
concerned persons—and this means everyone in society—especially those who have 
no voice, or who are excluded by incapacity from participation in the debate which 
affects their fate. A principle of universal concern is a dialogue-formative ineluctable.
This means also that such dialogue must try to forsee the effects of the progressive 
practice of the discipline in question on all members of society; in effect this means 
always mobilising the contributions of sociologists, anthropologists and other experts 
whose field of endeavour is the understanding of social processes and factors, within 
the debate, even when they are the partners of philosophy in critical dialogue towards 
ever-greater explicitness and self-awareness.
A principle of universal concern must posit each member of society as one of equal 
value with all others, and that this value must be progressively emancipated from the 
inevitable legacy o f social distortion. The debate must always avail of the corrective 
supplied by the contributions of groups historically disempowered by such irrational 
distortions as racism, sexism, ageism, and the like. This is a kind of principle of 
vigilance which detects entrenched and emerging distortions of the ineluctable value 
of the individual. A principle o f emancipation not only vindicates the value of the 
individual, but expresses this value in a system of rights, entitlements and duties 
belonging to full members of the community, a system which is itself under continued 
philosophical investigation and re-vision, with a view to an ever clearer perception of 
what rights, duties and entitlements there are, and what their particular justification is.
The study of philosophy encourages the appropriation by human beings of the 
resources with which their humanity is endowed, since philosophy attempts to be the 
clearest, most nuanced and most radical description of those resources; one might add 
that literature explores the same territory from a more concrete perspective, almost as
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though literature were an imaginative laboratory for the investigation of human 
possibility. It has been argued indeed that certain writers have been in advance of 
philosophers in their discoveries, and that only later did the philosophers catch up, 
Shakespeare and Tolstoy often being named in such arguments. History may be said 
to do the same, except its characters are real, and the study of history makes the 
present situation transparent as to its causes, those factors which determine or have 
determined the configuration of the present. However things may be in regard to the 
claims of individual disciplines, it is certainly true that the study of philosophy, 
literature and history have traditionally formed the basis of humanistic education, 
understood precisely as the emancipatory taking possession of the humanity that is 
revealed in these disciplines by individual human beings. Moreover there are none but 
practical arguments, of the ‘how shall we manage the time-table?’ variety, against, 
and many cogent arguments for, including such studies as secondary in the formation 
of scientists, and other practitioners of disciplines outside the humanities.
Each discipline is, moreover, in possession of what might be called ‘regional 
ontologies’, in that each deploys a categorial framework which determines what the 
discipline recognises as real, and a value scheme as to the relative importance o f such 
items. What is fragmented is unintelligible. If this principle is correct, then the 
ultimate intelligibility o f the discipline is revealed only in bringing its regional 
ontology explicitly into the whole of discourse, the overall ontology which is 
investigated by philosophy. This is not to denigrate the relative independence (an 
absolute independence is incoherent) of the regional ontology, nor is it to suggest the 
colonisation of other disciplines by philosophy, but merely to recognise the 
analogical, as opposed to the equivocal or univocal, nature of ontology, whose 
business it also is, besides investigating the categorial framework of discourse as 
such, to reconcile the differences without necessarily eliminating them, although in 
some cases this may be the logical course. The language of neuropsychology on the 
one hand, and first person narration, or talk within various disciplines (including 
philosophy itself) of notions like consciousness or motivation, on the other, might be 
an example of highly conflicted regional ontologies, one claiming the existence of 
certain entities such as intentions or the like, the other having no place for such items 
as genuine entities. The task of bringing these regional ontologies ‘home’ to some 
form of coherence within the totality o f ontology proper is one in which philosophy is 
an indispensable, but not the only, participant.
In practice, all this means that philosophy must be available not only to students who 
have chosen this area as an avowed area of study, but that its various disciplines must 
be available as a secondary, but necessary, field of study for students in other 
disciplines: the decision as to which philosophical disciplines are most suitable to 
such students itself being undertaken by a process of dialogue between philosophers, 
the students in question, and the practitioners of the students’ home discipline. For 
most, applied ethics will be a useful choice, as will logic, for some, courses in 
epistemology, hermeneutics, and even politics and ontology are also to be 
recommended. It may even be necessary to tailor such courses to the needs of these 
visitors to philosophy, showing how philosophical questions arise within their home 
disciplines, even though this might prove to be quite labour-intensive.
Finally, it is to be recommended that the university become, if  it is not already, a 
place o f philosophical culture. The university consists o f disciplines which
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continually make knowledge claims, which inculcate methods, ontologies and values 
in the minds of their apprentices. There must be a generalised knowledge, and one 
which is more than what Newman would describe as a floating opinion, regarding the 
relative quality and nature of such claims, the intelligibility of the various ontologies, 
the validity and range of the methods, and above all a nuanced and adequate 
understanding of the values embodied in the disciplines and of the university itself. As 
university people we stand for certain values, which implies having made decisions 
which downgrade or exclude certain items, while vindicating others, as valuable. We 
must have a coherent, nuanced and convincing justification of those values, otherwise 
we will find ourselves dumb before our critics. Such a justification means not just 
providing an apology for the status quo, but looking systematically, carefully and 
critically at the values we espouse, and being willing both to change when this is 
shown to be necessary, and to enter into non-superficial dialogue with other sectors of 
society, such as government, and with society at large, concerning those values, 
thereby in turn placing values accepted in these sectors and in society under 
discussion and evaluation. We must encourage open debate, appealing thereby to the 
rationality of our partners, whom we must encourage also to put cherished opinions at 
risk. An inward-looking university does none of those things, and encourages rather 
the making of decisions by other than rational means. The voice or voices of the 
university must be heard in all matters of public concern, and this means not just 
having relevant expertise, but a viable and accurate, ethical and logical 
Weltanschauung, which includes a theory of what constitutes best practice in the art 
of decision-making. The dictum ‘know thyself is as relevant to organisations as it is 
to individuals.
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